DTIC AD0760519: The USSR's Naval Challenge in the Indian Ocean

AD-760 51 9

THE USSR'S NAVAL CHALLENGE IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN

Burt Dali

Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
15 December 1972

ISliBS.

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STUDENT

essay"

15 December 1972

IDE USSR'S NAVAL CHALLENGE IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN

Colonel Burt Dall
Chemical Corps

NONRESIDENT COURSE

VS ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

national technical
information service

l1 S p- • f . r. „

' .A ; < t

USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Essay)

THE USSR'S NAVAL CHALLENGE IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN

by

Colonel Burt Dali,

Chemical Corps

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
15 December 1972

AUTHOR: Burt Dali, COL, CmlC

TITLE: The USSR's Naval Challenge in the Indian Ocean

FORMAT : Essay

The United States ' attention has been focused
anew on the Indian Ocean area because of the buildup of
the Russian Navy and the regular appearance of Soviet
naval vessels in the region. Questions are raised con¬
cerning the nature and consequence of the Soviet presence
Attitudes of the littoral states are examined and their
impact on possible US courses of action. The principal
problem concerns how to inhibit a Soviet hegemony in the
areu which might, in time, affect the central balance of
power adversely to American interests. Information and
data were collected from American, British, and SEATO
sources. There is some controversy regarding the actual
magnitude of the Soviet threat, but, nonetheless, there
appears to be one in the Indian Ocean area. A subsidiary
problem becomes evident : How to counter the threat of
the Soviets' effort to spread their influence without
resorting to a competitive buildup of forces. The solu¬
tion requires the US to emphasize and give credence to
its Foreign Aid and Security Assistance programs in order
to exert American political and military influence in the
region.

THE USSR'S NAVAL CHALLENGE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Ocean area, unlike Europe and Asia, has
been only on the margins of US attention. Never consid¬
ered of great importance to the central balance of power,
it has been on the edges of great power rivalry.

Recently, this perspective has been challenged and
attention has been refocused on the Indian Ocean. The
buildup of the USSR navy with the regular appearance
of Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean, has contri¬
buted tc this renewed interest.

This new attention raises important issues concern¬
ing US foreign and defense policy which require consid¬
eration. However, prior to any discussion of the sub¬
ject it would be helpful to review the history of the
Indian Ocean area.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A Georgetown University conference report on the
Indian Ocean summarizes salient historical aspects as
follows :

"Thr* Indian Ocean is the smallest of the three
grea- oceans of the world, and is the only one
not bounded by a major world power. The

history of the Ocean is long and complex, but
one outstanding feature is that none of the
littoral countries has ever exercised exclu¬
sive power across its face. At various times
trading empires based themselves on the west¬
ern approaches via the Red Sea cr the Persian
Gulf, while at other times strong maritime
states have existed in Sumatra and Java. But
it was not until Vasco da Gama rounded the
Cape of Good Hope in November 1497, five years
after Columbus' landfall in the West Indies,
that one nation was able to unite the eastern
and western halves of the Ocean under its own
domination." 1

Since Vasco da Gama's time, the Indian Ocean area
has seen outside power competition and influence. The
conference report continues:

"Portuguese power began to wane in the early
17th Century, while that of the Dutch grew,
and control of the lucrative spice trade
passed from Lisbon to Amsterdam. The cloth
and tea trade of India and China attracted
British — and for a time — French merchants,
but war in Europe and conquest in India gave
Britain predominance. The Dutch Empire in the
East Indies remained and the French held their
possessions in Southeast Asia, but to all
intents and purposes the Indian Ocean was a
British lake by the mid-nineteenth century.

A central and overwhelming position in the
Indian subcontinent was reinforced by control
over all the approaches to the ocean. Naval
bases protected shipping lanes and trading
posts from Capetown to Singapore. The build¬
ing of the Suez Canal posed a temporary threat,
but the purchase of shares by the British
government, followed by occupation of Egypt in
1882, ensured that the approach from the Medi¬
terranean was also safeguarded. Towards the

*R. M. Burrell and A. J. Cottrell, The Indian Ocean
A Conference Report (Washington: Georgetown University,
i»ie Center for Strategic ?nu international ^tudie". 1^71),
p. 11.

2

end of the nineteenth century a new European
power, Russia, began to take an increasingly
active interest in its southern borders, and
British efforts were bent on maintaining Persia
as a buffer against Tsarist expansion towards
India and on keeping the Persian Gulf free of
any Russian naval presence. British paramount-
cy in the Indian Ocean rested upon la^'i. mili¬
tary forces stationed in India and the conti¬
nued maintenance of the world's finest navy.

The first world war saw the destruction of the
latter, and the inter-war years saw the growth
of nationalist aspirations which would end the
former. " 2

i

To this day Portugal remains a significant regional
power through her control of the large territory of
Mozambique. French influence is still present, as France

controls several islands in the Indian Ocean, including

s

Reunion and the strategic port of Djibouti in the Gulf of
Aden. Also, France has maintained access to the large
naval base at Diego-Suarez in the Malagasy Republic. How¬
ever, the basic historic imprint in the region has been
British. By the end of World War II, though, British
supremacy in the area was more illusory than real and
proved short-lived.

This erosion was one of several factors that caused
the gradual emergence of American involvement in the
region. The United States pre-1945 interest in the area
was based on the availability of oil in the Persian Gulf

2Ibid. , pp. 11-12.

i

(

3

and by the Persian Gulf Command in Iran, which managed
delivery of land-lease equipment to the USSR. American
World War II association with Iran survived, mostly due
to the post-war USSR effort to detach Azerbaijan Pro¬
vince from Iran.

An American military presence was introduced to the
area in 1948, and still remains there. This force
(COMIDEASTFOR) consists of a small flagship, a converted
seaplane tender home ported at British facilities in
Bahrain, and two destroyers assigned on a rotational
basis from the Atlantic Fleet.

Under arrangements with the Saudi Arabian government
a Strategic Air Command (SAC) Recovery base was estab¬
lished at Dhahran in 1951, until terminated at Saudi
request in the early sixties. However, it appears that
Dhahran remains a key military airlift command transit
base .

During the 1950 's, military advisory and training
missions were sent to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia,
and today remain important assets in exercising of US
influence in peripheral areas cf the Indian Ocean.

■*Ibid. , pp. 68-69

^Richard C. Schroeder, Indian Ocean Policy (Washing¬
ton: Editorial Research Reports , l$7l) , p. 201.

4

Bilateral defense agreements were negotiated with Iran
and Pakistan in 1950 and 1954, respectively, which inter¬
locked with the Baghdad Pact of 1955 (CENTO after 1958)
and, in the case of Pakistan, with SEATO. ^ To fortify
US crowing interest in the Indian Ocean area, substan¬
tial military and economic aid was initiated in the early
1950 's and has continued to this day.

In the sixties, British power and influence continued
t decline. Twelve new independent states emerqed from
former British-controlled territories. During the same
period a parallel rise in US activity continued. The
People's Republic of China's (PRC) incursion into Indian
territory in the Northeast frontier in November 1962 led
to a substantial US military aid program. America's new
association with India survived until the India -Pakistani
three week war in September 1965. Meanwhile, close US
relations with Pakistan had deteriorated rapidly, in part
as a result of American post-1962 support of India.

During the early 1960 's the Departments of State and
Defense began thinking of the longer term strategic re¬
quirements of the US in the Indian Ocean area. Great
Britain had parallel interests with the US, which essen¬
tially centered on the need for secure communications

5

During November 1972 Pakistan announced her with¬
drawal from SEATO.

5

and transit rights through the Indian Ocean. In 1965
the British decided to sequester a number of sparsely
populated or unpopulated islands which had been under
the administrative jurisdiction of Mauritius and form a
group called the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) .

The outcome of the US-U.C interests was the BIOT Agree¬
ment, negotiated with the UK in December 1966. The
agreement provides for the BIOT remaining as UK terri¬
tory, for detailed agreements between designated adminis¬
trative authorities (i.e., US Navy and Royal Navy), and
for each government bearing the cost of its own sites.

The initial period covered by the agreement is 50 years ,
with a provision for a 20 year extension.

UNITED STATES 1 INTERESTS

The range of US interests in the Indian Ocean is com¬
plex. Our interests are these:

The oil of the Persian Gulf is vital to our allies
and cf consideraole direct interest to the United States.

About 30 of the 127 members of the United Nations
belong to the Indian Ocean Region, and one-third of the
world's population is there. Several of the nations,
such as, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, and the U.A.R.,
and, in certain respects, South Africa play a signficant

international role. Further, the US continues to be

concerned w. th assisting in the development of these
countries. The Center for International Studies of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology sees forward move¬
ment in economic development and towards political stabi¬
lity as the best means to promote an environment condu¬
cive to our own interests. ®

Conversely, the instability and mtra-regionai
antagonisms that characterize much of the Indian Ocean
area could serve to promote Soviet interests at the
expense of the US. The concern is with the potential
for instability in the Persian Gulf and what this might
mean to US and allied oil interests.

In addition to the BIOT, the US has other secu¬
rity interests in the area. The Indian Ocean must
remain available to free passage to US commercial and
military traffic, if only for contingency purposes.

Also, we require secure air routes into and across the
region.

It is to our interest that countries of the area
not pass under the control of forces hostile to the US.

®The Center for International Studies, "The United
States Interest and Foreign Aid", in Economics in Action,
ed. by Shelley M. Mark and Daniel M. Slate (San Francisco
Wadsworth Publishing Co. , Inc. , 1961) , pp. 415-416

Specifically, we would be concerned if PRC or Soviet
influence in the area extended to control of the water
areas7 or significant parts of the littoral.

US strategic interests in the Indian Ocean include
oil requirements. Over 50 5 percent of the oil required
by our western European allies and 90 ^ percent of the
oil used by Japan comes from the Middle East. This
assumes even greater importance when viewed in the light
of known oil reserves.

With the USSR naval presence in the Indian Ocean now
an established fact, the US faces the prospect of enhan¬
ced Soviet politico-military power flanking Africa, South
and Southeast Asia, and Australia. This calls attention
to the growing Soviet naval capability in reference to
the so-called choke points which control ingress and
egress to and from the basin. These include Bab el
Mandab at the southern -"'■‘-r^nce to the Red Sea, the
Strait of Hormuz at the Narrow of the Persian Gulf, and
on the eastern side the straits of Malacca and Sanda.

7There are only a few well defined shipping routes
through the Indian Ocean. Except for those which round
the Cape of Good Hope or pass through the Tasman Sea
around the South of Australia, the other transoceanic
luutes converge at the already creed choke points. Ships
which desire to avoid these choke points must add many
days, and in some cases, thousands of miles to their
voyages from European and other North Atlantic pores.

^Burrell and Cottrell, p. 65.

^Schroeder, p. 192.

8

The practical effect of the Soviet presence athwart
lines of communication would be acutely felt in the case
of armed hostilities. A Soviet attempt to block maritime
routes in peacetime could lead to a major world crisis.
Nonetheless, with appropriate military basing and estab¬
lishment of political preeminence in these funnel areas,
Soviet domination of the most critical of these choke
points is possible. The knowledge that in the event of
war or great tension, the USSR or its associated states
might control traffic into and out of the Indian Ocean
at one or more of these points could not but exert some
influence on the political orientation of those nations
who would be most affected should this contingency come
to pass.

In terms of strategic weapons , the Soviets would
probably make every effort to limit US use of the
Indian Ocean as a launching area for ballistic missile
submarines .

SOVIET INTERESTS AND STRATEGY

The Soviets, like the czars, ha''e long had an interest
in the Indian Ocean because of the opportunities it
offers for trade and for the extension of their political
influence and because it lies athwart the ice-free ocean
route between ports in the Western and Far Eastern USSR.

9

Currently, many of the merchant ships transiting the
Indian Ocean are Soviet.

Since the mid-1950's, the Soviets have demonstrated
a clear interest in the Indian Ocean area. Since that
time, for example, almost two-thirds of their financial
and economic aid has been devoted to third-world coun¬
tries ?n the Indian Ocean area. ^ it is however, in
the expansion and classic peacetime employment of their
navy in the Indian Ocean area, where they are using sea
pov/er to complement ongoJng economic and political objec¬
tives, that they have made a recent dramatic impact.

Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean v/as inaug¬
urated in the Spring of 1967 with the deployment of
ships with military and civilian crews for oceanographic
ard space-event support operations. Soviet combatant

deployments in the Indian Ocean were initiated in March
12

lq68. Since that date the Soviets have maintained

an essentially continuous presence in the Indian Ocean
and have increased the number of ship-days in that

^S^utheast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) , Short
Paper No. 50 - Soviet Interest and Influence in the
Indian Ocean Area (Banqkok: The Research Office, SEATO
1971) , pp. 18-22 and p. 47.

liIbid. , p. 13.

^Ibid. f p. 13.

10

Ocoan. This includes naval combatants, naval auxi¬

liaries, and oceanographic ships.

To enhance their staying power, the Soviets are
soliciting access to existing seaport facilities in
various locations in the Indian Ocean and its littoral.
If their efforts meet success, it could permit them to
develop a position of strength in such areas as the
Gulf of Ade: the southern gateway to the Red Sea.

The complexities of maintaining the Soviet Indian
Ocean squadron would be considerably ameliorated if the
Suez Canal is reopened. Supp3_ lines would be drastic¬
ally reduced, transit times shortened, and rotation of
units expedited. Similarly, with the canal opened to
traffic, the number of Soviet naval deployments into the
Indian Ocean would be increased significantly because
elements of their Black Sea fleet would become available
for rapid deployments south and east of Suez. 15

The Soviets continue to probe for facilities for

■^ibid. , pp. 13-14.

14Ibid. , p. 14.

^5The time required to deploy US naval units to the
Indian Ocean would be reduced also, but to a lesser
extent even though the US 6th Fleet could be employed on
short notice. In addition, access to Persian Gulf oil
by our western allies is of considerable strategic and
economic interest to the United States and would be
positively affected by the reopening of the Suez Canal.

their growing Indian Ocean fishing fleet which now
accounts for almost one-third ^ Qf their annual catch.
In 1970 they made a limited support agreement with
Mauritius and reportedly are now feeling out other
nations for additional assistance.

However, in addition to its economic and maritime
needs and local political considerations, SEATO writers
point out that :

"The importance of the Indian Ocean to the
Soviet Union must also be seen against the
background of the global objectives of
Soviet foreign policy. These objectives
include ensuring the security of the Soviet
Union, the expansion of Soviet influence
outside the Soviet bloc, the undermining
and disruption of Western influence and the
containment and, where possible, the elim¬
ination of Communist Chinese influence." 17

Admiral Zumwalt also supports the thesis of the Soviet
intent to outflank the PRC.

In its efforts to encircle the PRC, the USSR's
intent is to diminish PRC influence not necessarily to
preclude PRC naval expansion into the Indian Ocean
region. For unlike the Soviets, the Chinese have no

Schroeder, p. 197.

17SEATO, Short Paper No. 50, p. 8.
l®Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. , "Why We Must Meet
Russia's Naval Challenge," The Reader's Digest Magazine,
January, 1972, p. 128.

12

traditional interests in the Indian Ocean. Only
since the Communists cane to power in 1949 have they
made significant diplomatic or economic moves in the
area. These efforts, which include both trade and
foreign aid to selected countries like Tanzania and
Pakistan, are designed to improve the image of the
PRC to increase its influence. Militarily, the PRC
has not ventured out of its own coastal waters ,
although that nation has a few ships which are capable
of such deployments. To date, the PRC has seen little
value in operations of a naval force ir the Indian
Ocean.

However slight might be the encirclement of the
PRC by the USSR, the situation is potentially explo¬
sive, a threat to world peace, and, of course, contrary
to United States interest in maintaining political and
economic stability in Asia. Mr. Buchan summarizes
Communist China's predicament succinctly: She

" ... is the world's largest state, which for
the past generation has had an uncharacteris¬
tically dynamic leadership. She is surrounded,
on one side by a country with whom she has a
bitter territorial quarrel, but who is much
stronger than herself - the Soviet Union; on
the east, the Pacific side, by a country that
has in political terms been dormant in the
last quarter-century - - - Japan, but with the
shadowy American presence, and all that it
forebodes, in the background; on the south-west
by a country whose pretensions China bitterly
resents - India; and on the south by a string

of small and weak states.

19

US VERSUS USSR

As previously mentioned, the US has very important
interests in and ties to portions of the Indian Ocean
area. At the same time, the USSR appears to be determined
to gain supremacy or at least be in a position to exert
a significant influence over the area. Control of the
region would enable the USSR to adversely affect American
interests in the area. Also, it would permit the Soviets
to outflank the PRC and to open a bridgehead into all of
Southeast Asia. Therefore, it appears that the US should
be just as determined to prevent the USSR from taking full
control and shutting the US out of an increasingly vital
part of the world that Great Britain held in a firm grip
for the West until recently.

Notwithstanding the dialogue and agreements that have
been consummated recently between US and USSR officials,
the Soviets' ultimate goal of world domination persists
and is a threat. USSR excursions into the Indian Ocean
region are only part of the Soviets' grand strategy.

W. Averell Harriman, an acknowledged expert in interna^
tional affairs, in discussing American-Soviet relations,

^Alastair Buchan, "The Balance of Power in Asia After
Vietnam," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society,

(June 1969), p. 137.

14

stated that: "Russia is still the major threat we face
... the Soviets are trying to communize the world." 2®

As to Soviet intentions to drive east of Suez into
the Indian Ocean, Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Naval
Operations, has stated:

"... it's exactly what I would be doing if I
were running the Soviet empire... the presence
of their ships in the Indian Ocean in much
larger numbers than ours, coupled with an
aggressive foreign policy, gives them an oppor¬
tunity to acquire the same sort of port capa¬
bilities that they've been able to achieve in
the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. r 21

Admiral Zumwalt considers the Soviet Navy "... to be
a first class professional outfit ..." and "It is dramat¬
ically more powerful than it was ten years ago." 22

He goes further to point out the significance of the
Soviet naval expansion and the threat it poses to the US:

"The Soviets don't need a navy superior to
ours to protect their vital interests. They
can aspire to have a navy larger than ours
only for purposes of interfering with our
vital interests.” 23

20

W. Averell Harriman, "Reflections on American-
Soviet Relations," Perspectives in Defense Management,
(Winter 1971-1972) , pp. 11-li.

2^Admiral Zumwalt, Jr., p. 127.

22Ibid. , p. 127 .

23Ibid. , p. 127.

Vice Admiral Rickover in testimony to the House
Appropriations Committee regarding possible reductions
in US military forces versus the Soviet naval buildup
stated :

"If they now succeed in building a navv which
can prevent our navy from supporting overseas
military operations, they can have their way
over any issue for which we are not willing to
risk n^lear warfare." ^4

The threat posed by the Soviet naval buildup, how¬
ever, has turned out to be a controversial subject.
There are some who believe the buildup is more of an
optical illusion and some who believe the buildup to be
a fact but not as significant as it appears on the
surface .

In an analysis of the military aspects of the 1973
budget, the Brookings Institution points out:

"Contrary to popular impressions, there has
not been a major recent expansion in the size
of the Soviet Navy, although its quality has
improved. ... The Soviet navy has followed
a course similar to that of the US navy,
accepting lower force levels in return for
modernization. ... Nonetheless, the Soviet
navy is now a far more capable force than it
was earlier." 25

24

Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, "A Timely Warning,"

The Reader's Digest Magazine, January 1972, p. 129.

The Brookings Institution, Setting National Priori¬
ties: The 1973 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1^2) , p.

16

The analysis goes further to state:

"The widening presence of the Soviet navy
should not obscure the fact that it is primar¬
ily a defensive force, designed to blunt
nuclear attacks on the Soviet homeland that are
launched by carrier-based aircraft and strat¬
egic submarines." 26

The latter part of the statement is obviously allud¬
ing to the US naval threat to the USSR.

Hanson Baldwin, in commenting on Soviet sea power,
indicates there has been an overemphasis on the present
capabilities of Soviet sea power, that Soviet naval
power comprises both some of the best and worst in its
craft and weapons systems, and that the Russians are

primitive in logistics and maintenance, and they are

. . . 27

very weak in amphibious and antisubmarine capabilities.

But he goes on to show that

"The Russians, an any case, have accomplished
much with little; they have created in the
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean what Mahan
called 'fleets in being.' Like the German
High Seas Fleet in World War I, we are forced
to consider the Soviet ships, to reckon with
them and counter them. For they have already

26Ibid . , p. 89.

2 7

Hanson Baldwin, "Panelists' Comments," in Soviet
Sea Power, Special Report Series: No. 10, The Center for
Strategic ’’nternational Studies. (Georgetown Univer¬

sity, June 1969), p. 110.

17

had - partly due to clever propaganda and to
extensive western press coverage - political
and psychological influence disproportionate
to their combat effectiveness, and they have,
for Moscow, great preemptive value." 28

This same point is covered in much more detail in
the Georgetown University Conference Report on the
Indian Ocean. ^9 Also, in his book on Soviet naval
strategy, four years ago, Robert W. Herrick, points out
that Soviet naval propaganda was extensively and suc¬
cessfully "... employed to hide the fact of the USSR's
very great and potentially disastrous qualitative naval
inferiority vis-a-vis the NATO naval forces." 3°

Mr. Herrick also concluded that the Soviet naval strat¬
egy at that time did not support "... the popular view
that the Soviet Union is bent on the buildup of military

forces essential to any aim of world domination by force."
31

Similar conclusions have been contested for years.

The evidence indicates though, that if the USSR is not
seeking world domination by force it certainly has been
and is using her mi1itary forces to support attaining

2®Ibid. , p. 110.

OQ

Burrell and Cottrell, p. 27.

30

Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy - Fifty
Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis : US Naval
Institute, 1968) , p. 145.

3lIbid. , p. 144.

18

her political/international objectives on the road to
achieving her ultimate goal.

The USSR's recent drive to power in the Indian
Ocean area :s similar to the containment policy the US
once used against her and is accompanied by the usual
formal alliances, arms aid to the less developed nations,
and a display of military might. The intermediate Soviet
objective apparently is to obtain military port and air
bases stretching from the Middle East to the Bay of
Bengal. In the meantime the US is building a naval com-
munications center on the Island of Diego Garcia, due
south of India. Also, we are strengthening an American
base in Bahrain on the Persian Gulf and sending Seventh
Fleet vessels into the region on periodic patrols.

It should be noted, though, that expansion of US
activities in the Indian Ocean area is not the only
detriment to the USSR's actions to dominate the region.
The keystone to the Soviet effort is India, South Asia's
biggest and most powerful nation. India is by no means
a Soviet client but arms aid, a treaty of alliance, and
USSR vetoes in the United Nations during the December
1971 war with Pakistan have raised Russian influence.
However, Mr. Richard C. Schroeder points out:

"Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has
declared, 'We are opposed to the establish¬
ment of foreign military bases, and believe

19

that the Indian Ocean area should be an area
of peace . . . ' " 32

Further, with Ceylon maintaining particularly

friendly relations with the PRC there is not much chance

, 3 3

of the Soviets acquiring bases on that island.

Messrs McGarry and Tretiak go further by stating that:

"Local nationalism and the antagonism of major regional

states will limit the expansion of Soviet influence." ^4

Also, they indicate that:

"Challenges in this area will be particularly
dangerous for the USSR since her forces will
be operating at the end of long vulnerable
lines of communication ..." ^5

The latter point could be significant in a "cold war"
situation as well as in open hostilities.

It should also be noted that although India may be
a hurdle to the USSR acquiring bases in the Indian Ocean
area ,

"The Soviet Union continues to regard India
as a bulwark against Chinese hegemony and
American influence in Asia. A politically

■^Schroeder, p. 190.

■^SEATO, Short Paper No. 50, p. 17.

James McGarry and Daniel Tretiak, The Impact of
Developments in the Asian Pacific on South Asia and the
Indian Ocean Basin, 1972-1984 (Falls Church: Westing-
house Electric Corporation, Center for Advanced Studies
and Analysis, 1971), p. 10.

3^Ibid. , p. io .

stable and economically strong India alone
can wield such counterveiling influence. This
is the basis of Soviet economic assistance
and diplomatic support to India.” 36

CONCLUSIONS

We cannot assign a single value to the totality of
US interests in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, it
appears that over the next several years, US interests
there will be of a substantially lower order than those
in either of the great ocean basins, the Atlantic and
the Pacific. The US borders on the Atlantic and the
Pacific, and the nations of these areas are for the most
part economically, politically, and militarily more impor¬
tant to us than those on the Indian Ocean. However, there
does appear to be a requirement at this time for the US
to control, or decisively influence, portions of the
Indian Ocean and its littoral, given the nature of
American interests there and the current level of Soviet
and Communist Chinese involvement. We should consider,
that our present interests cannot be served solely by
normal commercial, political, and military access.

In sustaining US interests in the Indian Ocean region,
it should be recognized that there is a real problem for

36Maya Kulkarni, Indo-Soviet Political Relations
Bombay: Vora and Company , 1968 ) , p . 123.

21

the non-regional powers. A number of the littoral states,
among them India, Ceylon, and Tanzania, have on several
occasions expressed the desire to see the Indian Ocean
kept free of big-power rivalry. While this attitude to
some extent may condition the political atmosphere, it
does not change the fact that this vast ocean area
remains international waters or the fact that USSR and
the PRC have not been dissuaded from continuing to aug¬
ment their presence in the region.

Although the threat to any US interest in the Indian
Ocean appears to be of relatively low order compared to
Europe, it nevertheless is an area that merits close
and continuing attention, particularly in view of the
apparent Soviet and, to a lesser extent, Communist
Chinese objective to enlarge their influence and pres¬
ence in the region. Therefore, as we look at the
region over the period of the next few years, we note
that the US is faced with several policy dilemmas:

- How can America best respond to the increased
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean area and the
extension of Soviet influence?

- How can the US maintain its own ability to exert
military influence in that area in case of need without
acting in a way that would stimulate a competitive build¬
up of forces?

- How can the US encourage economic development,
international political responsibilities, and domestic
political stability in the countries around the Indian
Ocean and have good relations with them as a way of
limiting the development of Communist influence hostile
to American interests in those countries?

- How can the US insure maintenance of free transit
through the key access points to the Indian Ocean?

I only intend to address the first two questions,
because of the limited scope of this paper, and that is
to state that a partial but important part of the solution
to the problem posed by these questions is already in
existence, i.e., the use of foreign aid and the military
assistance programs that operate thereunder. In a discus¬
sion of the US interest and economic aid, it is stated
that economic aid can contribute to maintaining a stable
balance of military power "... insofar as it bolsters
military strength and the will to resist Communist aggres¬
sion, particularly in the nations bordering on the Soviet
bloc." 37

Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, former Chief of
US Army research and Development, supported the extension
of US economic aid as a necessity to keep the nations of

37The Center for International Studies, p. 415.

23

the Eastern Hemisphere free because: "Whoever controls
the area within a thousand-mile radius of Cairo today
(1960) can control most of the Eastern Hemisphere." 88

As mentioned, these programs are already in exist¬
ence. However, they are not receiving the emphasis and
support in the US Congress that is necessary for adequate
programs to fulfill the requirements in competing with
similar Soviet programs and the overt Soviet advances
discussed in this paper. The use of these programs is
the best method possessed by the US to:

- Economically and militarily develop the third
world nations,

- Exert influence over the nonaligned and under¬
developed nations, and thus

- Counter USSR influence without resorting to compe¬
tition in the buildup of forces and weaponry.

We will have to find answers to the remaining ques¬
tions within the constraints provided by our desire to
avoid a great-pc^er competitive buildup in the Indian
Ocean. There are factors which favor our objectives.
Among them are the efforts of some Indian Ocean countries

Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American
Military Policy (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company,

19615 fpTSUTr

to restrain Soviet military activity. Nonetheless, the
United States must decide ultimately whether or not it
will maintain the option to counter an enlarged Soviet
military buildup.

v ^ _£URT DALL

Colonel, CmlC
US Army, 054-20-1212

25

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